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Executive Summary 
This study examines the impact of union tactics on certification election win 
rates, first contracts and post-contract membership rates in the public sector. Based 
on an in-depth survey of union organizers in a national sample of public sector cer-
tification election campaigns the findings suggest that a grassroots, rank-and-file 
intensive strategy, building a union and acting like a union from the very beginning 
of the campaign are critical components of union organizing success. By comparing 
these findings with Bronfenbrenner's earlier study of private sector union campaigns 
(1993) we found that not only are these strategies important to the union's ability to 
win elections and first contracts, but they are equally important to the union's abil-
ity to sign up new members, and build a lasting, viable organization, after the election is 
won and the first contract is signed. 
Highlights of the study include: 
• In private sector NLRB campaigns, a grassroots, rank-and-file intensive or-
ganizing strategy including representative committees; personal contact; es-
calating pressure tactics; the use of rank-and-file volunteers from already 
organized units; a focus on dignity, fairness, and service quality as the pri-
mary issues; and building for the first contract during the organizing cam-
paign; were all found to be associated with win rates 10 to 30 percent higher than 
units which ran traditional campaigns with a focus on mass mailings and gate 
leafletting. 
• In state and local elections in the public sector, unions have an 85 percent election 
win rate and an 88 percent first contract rate, largely because few if any public 
sector employers offer any significant opposition to union campaigns. Not sur-
prisingly, the majority of unions organizing in the public sector run very low-
intensity organizing campaigns, primarily focusing on letters, leaflets and mass 
meetings. 
• In the eight percent of the public sector campaigns in the sample where the em-
ployer aggressively opposed the union campaign, election win rates plummeted 
to 33 percent and very few of the unions organizing in those units increased the 
intensity of their campaigns to match the employer campaigns. 
• The use of grassroots, rank-and-file intensive strategies led to higher win rates in 
the public sector, even in the context of little employer opposition. 
• Because of the prevalence of open and agency shops in the public sector, election 
win rates and first contract rates may not be the most valid measures of union 
success. Post-contract membership rates better capture union organizing success 
in the public sector. 
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• Using rank-and-file intensive tactics during organizing campaigns led to sig-
nificantly higher post-contract membership rates. House calling, represen-
tative committees, establishing bargaining committees before the election, 
and using one-on-one surveys all increased the likelihood of signing up a signifi-
cant portion of the unit after the contract was signed. Post-contract membership 
rates increased by six percent for each additional rank-and-file intensive tactic 
used by the union. 
• The findings suggest that the use of rank-and-file intensive tactics both increases 
membership rates and builds strong and vital unions. These tactics become even 
more important, given the recent political sea-change and the likelihood that this 
will lead to dramatically increased employer opposition in the public sector. 
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T he future of the American labor movement depends on a dramatic resur-gence in union organizing success in both the public and private sectors. Precipitous losses in membership from plant closings, sub-contracting, and 
layoffs in heavily unionized sectors such as manufacturing and state employment, 
coupled with employment growth in the largely unorganized service sector, have 
made it difficult for unions to organize enough new workers to keep membership 
levels stable, much less to grow. Yet such growth is absolutely necessary if the labor 
movement is to remain a significant force for social and economic justice in our 
workplaces and communities. 
A combination of unfettered employer opposition and weak and poorly en-
forced labor laws have made union growth even more difficult. Faced with this 
increasingly hostile external environment for organizing, the labor movement has 
begun to focus its energy on the one element of the organizing process which they 
can control — union strategy and tactics. For some, this has meant going beyond 
traditional NLRB campaigns to broader community-based and industry-based orga-
nizing. For others, this has meant a critical analysis of union organizing strategies 
during the NLRB election process, from targeting, to winning elections, to bargain-
ing first agreements. Still others have looked to more aggressive public sector orga-
nizing as a significant opportunity for union growth. 
Unfortunately, while there has been considerable macro-level research docu-
menting the magnitude of labor's decline in the private sector, there has been sur-
prisingly little micro-level research that looks intensively at the organizing process 
itself, especially the role played by union strategy and tactics. 
Bronfenbrenner's research (1993), conducted with the cooperation of the AFL-
CIO, was one of the first systematic examinations of the private sector certification 
election process. Her study examined both employer and union tactics in detail, as 
well as bargaining unit demographic and election background variables. Despite 
her confirmation of the prevalence of egregious employer behavior, she found that 
union tactics — what unions actually do during a campaign — as a group matter 
more than employer behavior or any other set of factors. Overall, her work suggests 
that if unions begin to act like a union and build strong rank-and-file organizations 
from the very beginning of the campaign, they can overcome the aggressive em-
ployer campaigns that have become so commonplace. 
Until recently, there had been no comparable research which focused on orga-
nizing activity in the public sector. During the same period that private sector em-
ployment and unionization rapidly declined, public sector employment and union-
ization rose dramatically. Although research on public sector organizing is especially 
difficult because data are only gathered by individual state-based labor relations 
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boards, the potential for union growth in the public sector has made it critically 
important for the labor movement to learn all that it can about successful public 
sector organizing strategies. 
To fill this gap, we recently compiled the first national database of public 
sector elections. The database included all certification elections which took place 
in state and local units in 1991-1992 in states which have some form of collective 
bargaining (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1995b). We found that unions are win-
ning 85 percent of their elections in the public sector across a broad spectrum of 
occupations, bargaining units, and employers. Our research showed that the dra-
matic difference between the consistently high win rates in the public sector and 
win rates in the private sector that average below 50 percent is primarily a function 
of the relative lack of employer opposition in the public sector (Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich, 1995b). 
It is important, however, to look more closely at what unions are doing in 
these public sector campaigns. In this paper we will examine the impact of union 
tactics on union elections and first contract rates based on an in-depth survey of 
union organizers in a national sample of public sector certification elections. But in 
the public sector we must go beyond election and first contract outcomes. Quite 
distinct from the private sector, most public sector units are open or agency shops 
where membership is voluntary. In this environment, election and first contract win 
rates are not necessarily valid measures of union success. Consequently, the primary 
focus of this paper is the impact of union organizing tactics on the union's later 
ability to sign up a majority of the unit as new members after the first contract is 
reached. 
Union Tactics in Private Sector Certification Election and First Contract Campaigns 
Most union organizers understand that union tactics matter in determining the out-
come of certification elections and that NLRB elections are often lost and won based on 
the effort, creativity, and resources that organizers put into the campaign. Yet, despite the 
large body of research, very few studies have examined the role played by union tactics in 
the organizing process. 
In part this is because many industrial relations researchers are not convinced 
that union tactics play a significant role in determining election outcome. Some, 
like Dickens, believe that union tactics are entirely reactive, determined solely by 
management tactics, and therefore should not and do not need to be included in 
organizing research models (1983). Others may believe that union tactics matter, but are 
unable to include them in their research models, both because they have a limited under-
standing of what tactics unions have available to them in organizing drives, and because 
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they lack access to union campaign data beyond what is available in LM2 forms. Thus 
most industrial relations research on private sector organizing continues to focus prima-
rily on the election, unit, and employer variables easily accessible in NLRB databases1. 
In 1988, Bronfenbrenner, in cooperation with the Organizing Department of the 
AFL-CIO, launched a study specifically designed to expand the body of knowledge avail-
able to the labor movement and scholars of the labor movement regarding factors con-
tributing to union success or failure in certification election campaigns (Bronfenbrenner, 
1993). Through a survey of the lead organizers of 261 NLRB certification election cam-
paigns, Bronfenbrenner was able to determine which union tactics had the most positive 
impact on union certification election outcomes while controlling for the impact of elec-
tion background, organizing climate, bargaining unit demographic, and employer charac-
teristic and tactic variables. 
Perhaps the most striking finding of the study was that union tactics as a group 
played a greater role in explaining election outcome than any other group of vari-
ables, including employer characteristics and tactics, bargaining unit demographics, 
organizer background, or election environment. This reveals that union strategies 
not only matter in determining election outcome, but that they may matter more 
than many other factors. 
For the labor movement, this means that union strategy and tactics can make 
a significant difference in whether they win or lose elections, even in a climate of 
intense employer opposition, economic decline, and weak public support. It also 
means that industrial relations research models which exclude union tactics are fail-
ing to capture one of the most important elements of the organizing process. 
What the study showed is that unions are most likely to win certification elec-
tion campaigns when they run aggressive and creative campaigns utilizing a grassroots, 
rank-and-file intensive strategy, building a union and acting like a union from the 
very beginning of the campaign. Thus, campaigns where the union focused on per-
son-to-person contact, housecalls, and small group meetings to develop leadership 
and union consciousness and inoculate workers against the employer's anti-union 
campaign, were associated with significantly higher win rates than traditional cam-
paigns which primarily utilized gate leafletting, mass meetings, and glossy mailings 
to contact unorganized workers. These results do not imply that something is inher-
ently bad about union leaflets and mailings, but rather that they act as a proxy for 
traditional campaigns where the focus of the union's energy and resources is on 
more indirect means of communication rather than the personal contact necessary 
to build the union and counteract the employer campaign. 
Unions were also more successful when they encouraged active rank-and-file par-
ticipation in and responsibility for the organizing campaign, including a large 
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rank-and-file organizing committee representative of the different interest groups in the 
bargaining unit. The importance of rank-and-file participation extends beyond the com-
mittee to include rank-and-file involvement in escalating internal and external pressure 
tactics which build solidarity and commitment to the union and compel the employer to 
run a less aggressive campaign. 
The findings also showed that it is essential that the union develop a long-
range campaign strategy that incorporates building for the first contract into the 
original organizing process by conducting bargaining surveys, selecting the bargain-
ing committee before the election, and working with the rank-and-file to develop 
proposals before the election. 
The issues the union focuses on during the campaign also play a very impor-
tant role in determining election outcome. Unions which focused on issues such as 
dignity, justice, discrimination, fairness, or service quality, were associated with much 
higher win rates than those which focused on more traditional bread and butter 
issues, such as wages, benefits, and job security. 
Lastly the study showed that unions were more successful when they placed 
an emphasis on developing a culture of organizing that permeated every activity and 
structure of the union. This includes a serious commitment of staff and financial resources 
to organizing, the involvement of the international in local union organizing campaigns, 
and the training, recruitment, and effective utilization of rank-and-file volunteers from 
already-organized bargaining units. 
In combination, what the results of Bronfenbrenner's study of private sector 
elections show is that union electoral success depends on the use of an aggressive 
rank-and-file intensive campaign. Not only did Bronfenbrenner find that all of the 
individual "rank-and-file intensive" tactics were associated with win rates 10 to 30 
percent higher than win rates in campaigns which did not use these tactics, but 
when these tactics were included in a regression equation controlling for the influ-
ence of employer tactics and characteristics, and unit and election background vari-
ables, Bronfenbrenner's findings suggest that the use of many of these tactics can 
improve the percentage of votes received by the union by as much as 3 percent and 
increase the probability of winning the election by as much as 10 percent. Given the 
fact that so many union NLRB election campaigns are lost by only a few percentage 
points, the results strongly suggest that if unions organizing in the private sector 
began to utilize all or most of these rank-and-file intensive campaign tactics, they 
could significantly improve their election win rate. 
Bronfenbrenner also found that the importance of this kind of rank-and-file 
intensive strategy did not stop with the union certification election. The complexity of the 
first contract process makes it difficult to find any direct link between union organizing 
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tactics during the certification election campaign and first contract outcome. What 
Bronfenbrenner's results suggest is that rather than directly impacting on first contract 
outcome, union tactics during the organizing drive influence employer and union tactics 
during the contract campaign, as well as employer resistance to unionization, and rank-
and-file and community support for the union's first contract effort. All of these factors in 
turn affect the ability of the union to bargain a first agreement. 
Bronfenbrenner's findings also suggest that unions significantly improved their 
chances of winning a first agreement if they continued to utilize a rank-and-file 
intensive strategy during the first contract campaign. This strategy includes: con-
tinuing the organizing after the election through housecalls, one-on-one contact 
and solidarity days; keeping the members informed through newsletters and regu-
lar membership meetings; and pressuring the employer from the outside through 
community-labor coalitions, corporate pressure tactics, and media campaigns. 
Just as in organizing campaigns, employers do have a great number of legal 
and illegal tactics at their disposal to thwart union efforts to bargain a first agree-
ment, and a significant percentage of employers are using these tactics very effectively. 
But what Bronfenbrenner's findings showed is that there are union tactics which can 
effectively defuse the employer campaign during both the organizing drive and the first 
contract, if they are used consistently, aggressively, and creatively. 
Organizing in the Public Sector 
Unions organizing in the public sector operate in a very different environment 
than those organizing in the private sector. Rank-and-file intensive strategies are 
essential to union success in NLRB election campaigns because they are the only 
way to generate the worker participation and commitment necessary to withstand 
an aggressive employer anti-union campaign and to counteract the anti-union im-
pact of the economic, political, and legal climate. Yet, as our research on public 
sector organizing has shown, unions organizing in the public sector operate in a 
climate largely free from the aggressive anti-union behavior that is so pervasive in 
the private sector (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1995b). 
We found that in the public sector nearly one quarter of the employers do not 
mount any campaign at all against the union. Even in those cases where public 
sector employers do oppose the union effort, most of the employer campaigns are 
limited to a few legal actions of extremely low intensity. This contrasts sharply with 
the private sector, where the overwhelming majority of employers launch aggres-
sive anti-union campaigns. Private sector employers are six times more likely than their 
public sector counterparts to commit unfair labor practices such as discharges for union 
activity, and are twice as likely to use other tactics such as captive-audience meetings, 
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employer leaflets and mailings, supervisor one-on-ones, and illegal wage increases. 
Given this much more favorable organizing climate in the public sector, it is not 
surprising that union win rates in the public sector average well above 80%, compared to 
an average win rate of just below 50% for NLRB election campaigns. The question then 
becomes what role do union tactics play in organizing in this very different labor-man-
agement context? 
Specifically, we will test if rank-and-file intensive campaign tactics have a posi-
tive impact on election win rates, first contracts, and membership rates. We would 
suggest that even with little employer opposition, these grassroots, union-building 
tactics are fundamental to creating a viable, lasting union. Without opportunities for 
participation by a diverse group of rank-and-file members in a structure that creates 
opportunities for activism and leadership development, it is difficult to sustain a 
strong union, particularly in the context of open and agency shops. 
Given the high win rates and lack of employer opposition in both certification 
election and first contract campaigns, we would suggest that union tactics would 
play a significant but not major role in determining the outcome of these public 
sector campaigns. Nevertheless, it is important to document the current organizing 
tactics of unions in the public sector to assess to what degree rank and file intensive 
strategies are being utilized. 
The higher variation in post-contract membership rates suggests that organiz-
ing campaign tactics play a much more important role in determining the ability of 
the union to sign up members once the first contract has been settled. To choose to 
become an actual member of a union involves considerably more commitment to 
the organization and is a direct function of the perception of and commitment to the 
union developed during the organizing campaign. Given the relative lack of em-
ployer opposition, a union may be successful at winning a certification election and 
first contract even if they run an extremely limited union campaign. However, with-
out a rank-and-file intensive and inclusive campaign, it is unlikely that a significant 
number of unit members would feel strongly enough about the union to become 
members. This is not only important for membership numbers and dues payment, 
but in the long run it is fundamental to the union's efforts to create an organization 
strong enough to win grievances, conduct contract campaigns, and win significant 
gains at the bargaining table. 
Research Methods 
Our research on public sector organizing strategies is based on a random sample of 
195 single union certification elections in units of fifty or more workers. A sample of 250 
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elections was drawn from our database of all public sector elections held in 1991 -1992 in 
the 35 states that have some form of collective bargaining (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 
1995b). Information was gathered from the lead organizer in each of the elections in our 
sample using an extensive survey on union tactics, bargaining unit demographics, and 
employer behavior. 
This paper is based on 195 survey responses which represent an 83 percent 
response rate. A comparison of elections where we have survey responses with the 
total sample indicates no bias in terms of geographical distribution, unit size, bar-
gaining unit type, or public entity when compared to the total population of single-
union certification elections in units over 50 in 1991-1992. 
Table 1 reports the basic characteristics of our sample. Elections are equally 
divided across years and across a wide variety of entities, divisions, and bargaining 
units. As in the population, elections are concentrated in school districts and in sup-
port staff and professional units. Significant activity is also occurring in clerical and 
wall-to-wall units, at colleges, public works departments, and social service agen-
cies; and in cities and towns. While there is slightly more variability in win rates in 
the sample than in the overall population, win rates remain high across a diversity of 
entities, units, and divisions. Over three quarters of the elections are consent elec-
tions and there are very few elections in units larger than 500. 
The Role of Union Tactics in Public Sector Certification Election Campaigns 
Given the relative lack of employer opposition it is not surprising that public 
sector union campaigns are significantly less intensive than those in the private sec-
tor. As we can see from Table 2, only a small percentage of the public sector unions 
in our sample ran the kind of aggressive rank-and-file intensive campaigns that 
Bronfenbrenner's private sector research showed are so critical to union success in 
NLRB elections. Instead, in the majority of these public sector organizing drives, 
the union ran a fairly limited campaign, with a focus on mass mailings, leafletting, 
and large group meetings, rather than union building, leadership development, and 
person-to-person contact. Fewer than 10 percent of the public sector organizers 
housecalled the majority of the unit, and only 23 percent developed active and 
representative rank-and-file organizing committees. Yet 46 percent of the unions 
sent out at least two mass mailings and 28 percent sent out at least four mass mail-
ings during the organizing campaign. 
As shown in Table 2, the intensity of the union campaigns increased only minimally 
as the intensity of the employer campaign increased. If we compare the 8 percent of the 
campaigns where the employer ran aggressive anti-union campaigns to the 46 percent of 
the campaigns where the union faced little or no employer opposition, we find that less 
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than a third of unions in the sample had an active representative committee, housecalled 
the majority of the unit, used solidarity days, elected the bargaining committee before the 
election, or signed up at least 70 percent of the unit on cards before filing the petition. In 
fact, the primary response to the more aggressive employer campaign was to dramati-
cally increase the number of leaflets and mass mailings, from an average of 2.68 letters 
and 3.51 leaflets in campaigns with little or no employer opposition, to 18.73 letters and 
21.33 leaflets in campaigns with intensive employer opposition. 
The weakness of the union campaigns in the face of employer opposition is re-
flected in the variation in win rates depending on the intensity of the employer campaigns. 
As shown in Table 2, union win rates averaged 90 percent in the 46 percent of the elec-
tions in the sample where there was little or no employer opposition, but dropped down 
to 66 percent in the 46 percent of the elections where the employer ran a campaign of 
medium intensity. For the eight percent of the campaigns where the employer ran an 
intensive campaign, the union win rate plummeted to 33 percent. 
This dramatic drop in win rates stands in sharp contrast to the private sector where, 
in units where employers ran aggressive anti-union campaigns, the union win rate dropped 
to 39 percent, from an overall win rate of 43 percent. This occurred despite the fact that 
employer opposition in the private sector, on average, was much more intensive than 
even the most aggressive public sector anti-union campaign. However, unlike in the pub-
lic sector, unions organizing in the private sector tended to run more aggressive cam-
paigns when faced with more intensive employer opposition.2 
Because the majority of public sector employers offer little or no opposition to 
union organizing efforts, unions can and do win the overwhelming majority of pub-
lic sector elections with only a minimal amount of effort. Yet, when faced with em-
ployer opposition, it is also clear that public sector unions are not, for the most part, 
rising to the challenge. Because of the lack of employer opposition, these low-in-
tensity campaigns had only a small impact on public sector unionization. However, 
given recent political changes and increasing attacks on public sector workers and 
their unions, it is clear that the climate of organizing in the public sector is changing 
rapidly. As these threats become more commonplace, the same kinds of rank-and-
file intensive campaigns that have proven successful in the private sector will be-
come equally necessary in the public sector. 
Beyond winning or losing election campaigns, what are the implications of 
these low-intensity campaigns in the public sector in terms of building a viable local 
or chapter? In the private sector the intense employer opposition — if the union is 
able to win an election — is a powerful force drawing people together behind a 
common goal. This unity is fundamental in mounting a campaign for a first contract, 
subsequent agreements, contract campaigns, grievance handing and so many other 
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functions of the union. The question is, without these forces to coalesce against, are long 
term viable organizations possible in the public sector? 
Union Tactics and Public Sector First Contract Rates 
The dramatic contrast between the public and private sector organizing expe-
rience continues beyond the certification election to the first contract process. Not 
only are unions winning 85 percent of all public sector certification elections but our 
study showed that they are then going on to achieve first agreements in 88 percent 
of the units where they won the election. This compares to a private sector first 
contract rate that most studies have found to average 75 to 78 percent 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1993; Cooke, 1985; Pavy, 1994). This lower first contract rate, 
combined with a certification election win rate of 48 percent, means that in the 
private sector, for every 100 units the labor movement attempts to organize, only 36 
percent end up being covered under a collective bargaining agreement. In contrast, 
in the public sector, unions win first agreements for 75 percent of the units they 
attempt to organize. 
Although there has yet to be an in-depth study of employer behavior in public 
sector first contract campaigns, our research once again points to the relative lack of 
employer opposition as the primary explanation for the difference in first contract 
rates between the public and private sector. As Bronfenbrenner found in her re-
search on private sector first contract campaigns, more than a third of private sector 
employers violate the National Labor Relations Act through unilateral changes, sur-
face bargaining, stalling tactics, or outright refusal to bargain. Still others shut down 
the plant, or contract out the entire workforce, to avoid signing a union agreement. 
Yet, under current law, the worst penalty for employers engaged in such actions is an 
order to bargain in good faith (Bronfenbrenner, 1994). 
In the public sector, employer vulnerability to public and political pressure 
coupled with state collective bargaining laws more conducive to facilitating first 
contract settlement, has made such out-right union busting during the first contract 
process, a relatively rare occurrence. Given our findings that only eight percent of 
public sector employers aggressively opposed union efforts to organize their 
workforce, and that unions were only able to win a third of the campaigns where 
they faced such opposition, that leaves only a handful of public sector employers 
who might continue the anti-union effort during the first contract campaign. 
Because of the lack of employer opposition, unions bargaining for first agreements 
in the public sector are able to do so even in those cases where they ran relatively low-
intensity organizing campaigns. Just as public sector certification election win rates re-
mained extremely high regardless of the intensity of the organizing union campaign, first 
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contract rates also were consistendy high regardless of the union organizing effort. As we 
can see from Table 3, first contracts rates were several percentage points higher in those 
units where unions use more rank-and-file intensive tactics such a representative com-
mittee, housecalling the majority of the unit, using solidarity days, and establishing the 
bargaining committee before the election. The number of mass mailings and the number 
of leaflets distributed was also lower in units where a first contract was achieved. How-
ever, first contract rates were also well above 80 percent in units where they did not use 
rank-and-file intensive tactics during the organizing campaign. 
Once again, because of the lack of employer opposition in the public sector, unions 
are able to win first agreements, even in those cases where they do not build a union and 
develop leadership during the organizing campaign. The question becomes: without that 
effort, what kind of union do they have once that contract is in place? 
The Role of Union Tactics in the Public Sector Membership Process 
Because of the prevalence of open and agency shops in the public sector, elec-
tion and first contract win rates may not be the best measures of union success in the 
public sector. In this context, post-contract membership rates may be considerably 
more appropriate. Particularly because membership in most cases is voluntary, mem-
bership rates indicate significantly more commitment to an organization, precisely 
the kind of commitment that is necessary to ensure a vital functioning union over 
time. The question is: how do union tactics utilized in the organizing campaign 
impact on post-contract membership rates? 
From Table 4 we can examine this relationship by looking at the impact of 
union tactics on campaigns that resulted in less than 60 percent post-contract mem-
bership, those with between 60 and 90 percent and those with over 90 percent 
membership. It is clear from these data that unions tactics matter in post-contract 
membership rates. Furthermore, the data suggest that the rank-and-file intensive 
and union-building strategies and tactics Bronfenbrenner found to be so important 
in the private sector are equally important here. For, just as these tactics build the 
membership commitment and rank-and-file leadership necessary to withstand an aggres-
sive employer campaign, this same membership commitment and rank-and-file leader-
ship becomes critical to membership participation in the union which develops once the 
first contract is in place. 
For example, representative rank-and-file organizing committees were used 
in only three percent of the campaigns that resulted in a post-contract membership 
of less than 60 percent. However, they were utilized in 34 percent of the campaigns 
that achieved 60 to 90 percent membership and 35 percent in those units that reached 
more than 90 percent membership. The size of the organizing committee also had a 
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positive impact on membership rates. Unions achieving over 90 percent post-contract 
membership rates had committees representing nine percent of the unit, compared to 
only three percent of the unit in those campaigns that yielded less than 60 percent post-
contract membership. These data show that unions that utilizing more inclusive organiz-
ing tactics are much more successful in achieving high membership rates after the elec-
tion is won and the first contract has been settled. The use of active and representative 
rank-and-file committees not only demonstrates to workers that the union is an inclusive 
and democratic organization, but also these committees develop the leadership necessary 
to build a lasting and vital organization and to organize members once the contract has 
been achieved. 
From Table 4 we can see that building for the first contract prior to the elec-
tion was also key in achieving a high post-contract membership rate. Unions formed 
bargaining committees before the election in only three percent of those campaigns 
where less than 60 percent of the bargaining unit became members after the con-
tract was bargained. Yet unions established bargaining committees prior to the elec-
tion in 24 percent of the units with a 60 to 90 percent post-contract membership 
rate and 15 percent of the units with a 90 percent post-contract membership rate. 
Here the data suggest that it is important not only to be inclusive but to develop 
rank-and-file leadership and begin acting like a union from the very beginning of 
the organizing campaign. 
Housecalling had a similar impact. Only 38 percent of the membership were 
housecalled in elections that yielded less than 60 percent membership, while 40 
percent and 44 percent were housecalled in campaigns that yielded 60 to 90 percent 
membership and more than 90 percent membership, respectively. Unions were also 
more than twice as likely to housecall the majority of the unit in campaigns where 
they achieved post-contract membership rates of more than 60 percent. 
Housecalling is a particularly effective means of building membership com-
mitment and developing leadership because only through housecalls does the orga-
nizer have the time and opportunity to listen to members' concerns and teach them 
what it means to be a union member. Unions which housecall the majority of the unit are 
also much more likely to be in tune with the primary issues and concerns of the bargain-
ing unit and, therefore, much better able to address those concerns once the election has 
been won. Equally important, during housecalls the organizer is able to speak with both 
the worker and the worker's family, building family support for the union. This in turn 
could have a very positive impact on whether or not the worker later decided to become 
a dues-paying member of the union. 
The importance of personal contact is also supported by the findings on the 
percentage of workers who were surveyed one-on-one regarding their contract pri-
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orities and concerns. Unions surveyed an average of 17 percent of the bargaining unit in 
campaigns that resulted in a more than 90 percent post-contract membership vote, com-
pared to only 10 percent of the unit in those campaigns which resulted in 60 to 90 percent 
and only three percent of those campaigns which resulted in less than 60 percent post-
contract membership. Clearly this kind of direct contact with rank-and-file membership 
is a significant determinant of membership rates both because of the input the union 
receives and because these surveys demonstrate that the union is seriously interested in 
addressing the workers' concerns. 
As would be expected, the use of printed materials such as letters and leaflets 
had a negative impact on post-contract membership rates. On average 5.28 leaflets 
were distributed in campaigns where unions achieved less than 60 percent member-
ship, 4.88 were used in those which achieved 60 to 90 percent post-contract mem-
bership, and only 4.04 were used in those highly successful campaigns where the 
union achieved more than 90 percent post-contract membership. A similar pattern 
emerges in terms of campaign letters. Once again, leaflets and letters act as a proxy 
for more traditional campaigns that fail to focus union resources and energy on per-
sonal contact, leadership development, and union building, all factors critical to 
membership participation and commitment after the first contract is achieved. 
For other union tactic variables listed in Table 4, such as solidarity days, the 
impact on post-contract membership rates is less clear. Unlike the private sector, 
where wearing a union button or t-shirt involves considerable risk and therefore 
represents a serious commitment to the union, in the public sector these actions 
involve very little risk for the employees involved and therefore are less significant 
in the union-building process. Not surprisingly then, the use of these tactics has less 
of an impact on post-contract membership rates. 
In addition to the positive effect on membership rates exhibited by each of 
the individual union tactic variables, an overall rank-and-file strategy, incorporating 
as many of these tactics as possible, was also found to be associated with signifi-
cantly higher win rates. As shown in Table 4, the mean number of rank-and-file 
intensive tactics used by the union was 1.79 in units with a post-contract membership rate 
of less than 60 percent, increasing to 2.55 in units with 60 to 90 percent post-contract 
membership, and 2.59 in units with 90 percent membership. 
Even more striking is the finding that none of the units with post-contract member-
ship rates of less than 60 percent used five or more rank-and-file intensive tactics during 
the organizing campaign, while seven percent of the units with 60 to 90 percent, and 17 
percent of the units with over 90 percent post-contract membership, used five or more of 
these tactics.3 
Overall, the public sector findings are clearly consistent with Bronfenbrenner's 
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earlier research on the private sector. Campaigns that build the union from the very be-
ginning using person-to-person contact through housecalls, small group meetings, and 
surveys, instead of traditional gate leafletting or letters, are able to achieve significantly 
higher membership rates. Furthermore, unions were able to achieve higher membership 
rates when they focused on leadership development through the use of active representa-
tive organizing committees and establishing a bargaining committee before the election. 
But as our findings suggest, unions cannot simply graft individual union tactics to a more 
traditional organizing approach. Instead, these tactics are only truly effective when the 
become integrated into an overall grassroots, rank-and-file approach to organizing. 
Conclusions 
Our data overwhelming demonstrate that union tactics are fundamentally im-
portant for organizing in the public sector. By utilizing grassroots rank-and-file strat-
egies, unions can raise their certification election win rates even higher. While the 
findings are somewhat less dramatic than in the private sector, they are no less im-
portant. Like in the private sector, involving a diverse group of rank-and-file mem-
bers in building and acting like a union from the very beginning of the organizing 
campaign, works. 
For beyond winning elections, our data suggest that the use of this grassroots 
strategy is fundamental to achieving high membership rates in the public sector. Winning 
elections and achieving first contracts are indeed hollow if too few workers join their 
union to enforce that contract or maintain its long-term viability. It is only by involving 
rank-and-file workers in a democratic and inclusive process and developing an activist 
structure, that workers are going to become part of a union that will live up to its full 
potential. 
The use of these tactics is even more important given the rapidly changing 
workforce. With the entrance of a massive numbers of women and people of color, unions 
must recognize that these workers are central to the future of the labor movement. In-
stead of seeing these workers simply as pressure groups to be integrated into extant union 
structure, the labor movement needs to begin this process of democracy and inclusion 
early on in the organizing campaign. While there has been a great deal of discussion about 
the organizing model of unionism as a way of making unions more inclusive and respon-
sive, this model is unrealistic if inclusiveness, participation, and leadership development 
are not integral to union organizing itself. 
While this research points to the importance of these rank-and-file intensive 
strategies, it is also clear that they are not the norm in organizing campaigns in the 
pubic sector. The lack of intensive employer opposition has allowed unions in the 
public sector to win with very low-intensity campaigns. As we have seen, these 
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campaigns yield election victories and first contracts, but do not necessarily yield union 
members and strong, vital organizations. 
Data from our original public sector database on decertification and challenge 
elections may indicate the consequences of not conducting rank-and-file intensive 
campaigns. One out of every six elections in the public sector is a multi-union chal-
lenge election where another union challenges the incumbent union which already 
represents the workers in that unit. Furthermore, in two-thirds of these elections 
the incumbent union loses representation to the challenging union. There are also a 
significant number of single-union decertification elections with unions winning 
only 45 percent of those elections. While it will require further research to examine 
the factors behind this turnover and loss, the high decertification rate suggests that 
the low-intensity campaigns that are more typical in the public sector are not build-
ing units and unions strong enough to withstand a challenge. 
Organizing in the public sector will continue to be central to all efforts to 
rebuild and revitalize the American labor movement. As we have demonstrated, the 
increased utilization of rank-and-file intensive, grassroots tactics are crucial to ef-
forts by unions in the public sector to improve their organizing efforts. Given recent 
political changes, we may very well see a frontal attack on public employees and 
their unions in the coming months and years. As our data show, if in fact this be-
comes the case, then the use of these tactics will be fundamental for unions to 
organize and stay organized. 
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Endnotes 
1 For a detailed review of the literature on union tactics see Bronfenbrenner, 1993 and Lawler, 
1990. 
2 In her private sector study, Bronfenbrenner found the majority of "rank-and-file intensive" 
union tactic variables to be significantly and positively associated with the certification elec-
tion outcome when included in regression and Logit analyses controlling for the influence of 
other election background, employer characteristic and tactic, bargaining unit demographic, 
and organizer background variables. Similarly, traditional campaign tactics, such as the number 
of union mass mailings, were associated with significantly lower union win rates. Not surpris-
ingly, in our public sector analysis, it was employer tactics rather than union tactics that were 
found to have the greatest effect on certification election outcome when included in a regres-
sion or Logit model controlling for the influence of other variables. In fact, we found that for 
every additional anti-union tactic utilized by the employer, the probability of the union win-
ning the election declined by 7 percent and the percent of the votes received by the union 
declined by 3 percent. In contrast, with the exception of the percent of the unit which signed 
cards before the petition was filed, the percent of the unit which was surveyed one-on-one 
during the election campaign, and the number of union mass mailings, none of the individual 
union tactic variables exhibited a statistically significant effect on certification election out-
come when included in a regression or Logit model. Union rank-and-file intensive tactics as a 
group did exhibit a statistically significant positive impact on election outcome in both the 
Logit and regression models. The probability of the union winning the election increased by 6 
percent and the percent of the votes received by the union increased by 3 percent for each 
additional rank-and-file intensive tactic used by the union during the organizing campaign. 
3 To further test our findings we used ordinary least squares and Logit analysis to test several 
models of membership rates. Through these models we were able to test the independent 
effect of individual union tactic variables, holding other variables, such as election background, 
bargaining unit demographics constant. The actual equations varied depending on which vari-
ables were included and which methods were utilize, but across all methods and models sev-
eral important union tactic variables exhibited strong independent effects. The percentage 
using representative committees, the number holding small group meetings and those that had 
a bargaining committee prior to the election all had strong positive impact on membership 
rates. The number of letters had a strong negative effect. When individual union tactics were 
combined into a single rank-and-file intensive scale variable the multi-variate results were 
even stronger. The probability of the union achieving a post-contract membership rate of at 
least 60 percent increased by nine percent and the percent membership rate increased by six 
percent for each additional rank-and-file intensive tactic used by the union. 
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TABLE 1: Characteristics of the Sample of State and Local Public Sector 
Number of Elections Percent Wins 91-92 
Year 
1991 
1992 
Public Entity 
State 
City 
County 
Town 
School District 
Special District 
Higher Education 
Employer Division 
All or Cross/Entity 
School District 
Public Works 
Courts 
College/University 
Social Services 
Hospital 
Police 
Fire/EMT 
Administrative 
Corrections 
Transit 
Bargaining-Unit Type 
Clerical 
Blue Collar 
Support Staff/ 
Security 
Technical 
Combined 
Professional 
Wall-to-Wall 
Police/Fire 
Supervisory 
Election Type 
Consent 
Stipulated 
Ordered 
Unit Size 
50-99 
100-499 
500-999 
1,000-10,000 
Total Elections 
100 
95 
12 
32 
36 
7 
77 
13 
18 
32 
77 
16 
7 
18 
17 
7 
4 
5 
6 
4 
2 
16 
10 
85 
4 
1 
9 
31 
18 
10 
11 
111 
20 
39 
112 
74 
1 
8 
195 
70% 
80 
83% 
84 
75 
100 
71 
69 
61 
91% 
71 
81 
71 
61 
71 
57 
100 
80 
100 
75 
0 
56% 
80 
69 
75 
100 
78 
77 
94 
90 
82 
79% 
65 
79 
76% 
73 
100 
75 
75 
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1995b) 
TABLE 2: Union Tactics in Public Sector Elections 
Overall Sample No or Weak Employer Campaign* Medium Employer Campaign Intensive Employer Campaign 
Sample 
Proportion or 
Mean 
Proportion or 
Mean for 
Wins 
% Win 
Rate" 
Sample 
Proportion 
or Mean 
Proportion or 
Mean for 
Wins 
% Win 
Rate" 
Sample Proportion or 
Proportion Mean for % Win 
or Mean Wins Rate" 
Sample Proportion 
Proportion or Mean for % Win 
or Mean Wins Rate" 
Outcome 
Election Outcome 
First Contract Outcome 
Post-Contract Membership 
Union Tactics 
Percent cards 
At least 70% cards 
Organizing committee used 
Percent on committee 
Representative committee 
Diagrammed workplace 
Percent housecalled 
50% or more housecalled 
Number of mass meetings 
Number of small group meetings 
Percent surveyed one-on-one 
Rank-and-file did housecalls 
Solidarity days used 
Number of letters 
Number of leaflets 
Dignity, fairness primary issues 
Bargaining committee before election 
At least 1 organizer per 100 eligible voters 
.75 
.66 
.70 
.60 
.31 
.77 
.07 
.23 
.59 
.40 
.09 
4 82 
11.63 
.10 
.17 
.17 
4.47 
6.07 
.38 
.15 
.76 
1.00 
.88 
.72 
.63 
.38 
.77 
.07 
.23 
.53 
.40 
.07 
4.37 
10.34 
.11 
.17 
.19 
3.21 
4.59 
.36 
.16 
.78 
.75 (.00) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.92 (.68) 
.74 (.77) 
NA 
.77 (.75) 
.68 (.84) 
NA 
.56 (.77) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.76 (.76) 
.82 (.73) 
NA 
NA 
.71 (.78) 
.79 (.74) 
.77 (.67) 
.90 
81 
.67 
.60 
.36 
.70 
.06 
.16 
.46 
.39 
.06 
3.74 
6.90 
.10 
.08 
.13 
2.60 
3.51 
.35 
.14 
.77 
1.00 
.90 
.68 
.62 
.38 
.72 
.06 
.16 
.44 
.41 
.05 
3.85 
7.21 
.09 
.08 
.15 
2.68 
3.69 
.35 
.16 
.75 
.90 (.00) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.97 (.86) 
.92 (85) 
NA 
.93 (.89) 
.85 (.94) 
NA 
.80 (.91) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
1.00 (94) 
1.00 (88) 
NA 
NA 
.90 (91) 
1.00 (.88) 
.88 (95) 
.58 
.75 
.59 
.26 
.81 
.08 
.29 
.66 
.42 
.11 
5.14 
12.30 
.11 
.23 
.18 
3.98 
6.16 
.40 
.15 
.75 
1.00 
.88 
.77 
.64 
.34 
.81 
.08 
.33 
.66 
.40 
.10 
5.05 
14.61 
.13 
.27 
.20 
3.25 
5.88 
.38 
.15 
.81 
.66 (.00) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.87 (.59) 
.67 (.65) 
NA 
.76 (.64) 
.66 (.67) 
NA 
.60 (.67) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
83 (.66) 
.75 (.64) 
NA 
NA 
.63 (.69) 
69 (.66) 
.72 (.50) 
.33 
.28 
.76 
59 
.33 
1.00 
.08 
.33 
.93 
.33 
.20 
9 6 7 
36.87 
.09 
.25 
.33 
18.73 
21.33 
.40 
.20 
.80 
1.00 
.80 
.71 
.76 
.80 
1.00 
.11 
.40 
.80 
.10 
.00 
5.60 
12.40 
.09 
.00 
.60 
11.20 
4.80 
.20 
.20 
1.00 
.33 (.00) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.80 (.10) 
.33 (.00) 
NA 
.40 (.30) 
.29 (1.00) 
NA 
.00 (.42) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.00 (.33) 
60 (.20) 
NA 
NA 
.17 (.44) 
.33 (.33) 
.42 (.00) 
• The employer campaign breakdown was created as follows: "No or Weak Employer Campaign" includes all elections where the employer ran no campaign or used only one tactic (46 /o cJ sample). Medium Employe^Campaign 
includes aPH e^ections'where the employer used 2 to 5 anti-union tactics (46% of sample); "Intensive Employer Campaign" includes all elections where the employer used more than, ive tactics ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t o n 
include: captive audience meetings; anti-union committees; anti-union leaflets; supervisor one-on-ones; unscheduled wage increases during the campaign; promises of improvements M wages, benefits, or worKing conditions, promonon 
of key union leaders; and media campaigns. 
Number in parentheses lists the percent win rate when the characteristic did not occur. 
TABLE 3: Union Organizing Tactics and First Contract Rates 
First Contract Rate 
Union Tactics 
Percent cards 
At least 70% cards 
Organizing committee used 
Percent on committee 
Representative committee 
Diagrammed workplace 
Percent housecalled 
50% or more housecalled 
Number of mass meetings 
Number of small group meetings 
Percent surveyed one-on-one 
Rank-and-file did housecalls 
Solidarity days used 
Number of letters 
Number of leaflets 
Dignity, fairness primary issues 
Bargaining committee before election 
At least 1 organizer per 100 eligible voters 
Sample 
Proportion or 
Mean 
.60 
.31 
.77 
.07 
.23 
.59 
.40 
.09 
4.82 
11.63 
.10 
.17 
.17 
4.47 
6.07 
.38 
.15 
.76 
Proportion or 
Mean for First 
Contract 
.63 
.39 
.77 
.07 
.25 
.56 
.40 
.07 
4.33 
10.13 
.10 
.17 
.19 
3.14 
4.63 
.37 
.15 
.80 
% Contract Rate* 
NA 
.91 (.87) 
.88 (.88) 
NA 
.94 (.86) 
.91 (.85) 
NA 
.90 (.88) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.92 (.92) 
.89 (.88) 
NA 
NA 
.90 (.87) 
.90 (.84) 
.84 (.89) 
* Number in parentheses lists the first contract rate when the characteristic did not occur. 
TABLE 4: Union Tactics and Post-First Contract Membership Rates 
Post-Contract Membership Rate* 
Union Tactics 
Percent cards 
At least 70% cards 
Organizing committee used 
Percent on committee 
Representative committee 
Diagrammed workplace 
Percent housecalled 
50% or more housecalled 
Number of mass meetings 
Number of small group meetings 
Percent surveyed one-on-one 
Rank-and-file did housecalls 
Solidarity days used 
Number of letters 
Number of leaflets 
Dignity, fairness primary issues 
Bargaining committee before election 
Number of R&F Intensive Tactics Used*** 
Union campaign included 5 or more 
tactics 
At least 1 organizer per 100 eligible voters 
Proportion or 
Mean for All Units 
With Contracts 
.63 
.39 
.77 
.07 
.25 
.56 
.40 
.07 
4.33 
10.13 
.10 
.17 
.19 
3.14 
4.63 
.37 
.15 
2.32 
.09 
Proportion or 
Mean with Less 
than 60% 
Membership 
.58 
.22 
.78 
.04 
.03 
.57 
.28 
.03 
4.42 
8.11 
.03 
.14 
.19 
4.89 
5.28 
.36 
.03 
1.78 
.00 
Proportion of Mean 
with 60-90 % 
Membership 
.62 
.41 
.74 
.08 
.34 
.64 
.40 
.10 
4.50 
14.81 
.10 
.23 
.21 
2.05 
4.88 
.26 
.24 
2.55 
.07 
Proportion or Mean 
with 90% or More 
Membership 
.67 
.48 
.80 
.09 
.35 
.46 
.44 
.07 
4.09 
7.57 
.17 
.13 
.17 
2.76 
4.04 
.46 
.15 
2.59 
.17 
.80 .78 .76 .85 
Twenty-nine percent of the elections in the sample had a post-contract membership rate of less than 60%, 34% had a membership rate of 
between 60 and 90% and 37% had a membership rate of 90% or more. 
" Number in parentheses lists the first contract rate when the characteristic did not occur. 
*** Rank-and-file tactics include the following: 70% or more of the unit signed cards before the petition was filed; union had a representative 
committee; union used small group meetings; union housecalled the majority of the unit; union used rank-and-file volunteers to do housecalls; 
dignity, fairness, and service quality primary issues; union used one-on-one contract surveys; and bargaining committee established before the 
election. 
